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ABSTRACT: There has long been a debate on the possible  similarity between some forms 
of Indian and Greek idealistic monism (Advaita and Neoplatonism). After a basic historical 
introduction to the debate, the text proposes that Paramādvaita, also known as Kashmiri 
Shaivism, is a more suitable comparandum for Neoplatonism than any other form of Advaita, 
suggested in the debate. Paramādvaita’s dynamic view of reality summarized in the terms 
prakāśa-vimarśa or unmeṣa-nimeṣa, corresponds quite precisely to the viewpoint of 
Neoplatonism, summarized in the similar bipolar terms such as prohodos-epistrophe. The 
context of the dynamic nature of reality doctrine is also quite similar (svataḥsiddhatva, 
authypostasis). My arguments are based on the texts of Plotinus and Proclus (Neoplatonism) 
and the texts of Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva and Kṣemarāja (Paramādvaita). Several parallel 
doctrines of both systems are further discussed: the doctrine of creative multilevel 
subjectivity, the doctrine of mutual omnipresence of all in all, the doctrine of creative 
multilevel speech, and some corresponding doctrines on aesthetic beauty and its important 
role in the Soul’s return towards its ultimate source. Some implications of the high degree of 
correspondence between both systems are considered at the end of the paper, for instance 
whether some similarities of compared systems might be explained on a structural basis, 
since both schools ware facing similar sceptical critique (Mādhyamika, Hellenistic 
scepticism). 
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The following text is a contribution to comparative studies of Greek and Indian forms 
of monistic idealism
1
, based on the texts of Plotinus (ca 204-270 AD) and 
________________________ 
 
JUST, MICHAL: Department of Philosophy and History of Sciences, Charles 
University, Prague, Czech Republic. Email: suryadasa@gmail.com 
                                                 
1 I am deeply aware of the tentativeness of the term ‘idealism’, especially in connection with non 
western philosophy.  Here, I mean it to point out, approximately, that cognitivity is an essential core 
for a given philosophical system and not just an epiphenomenon of something else. Further discussion 
in: Lusthaus 2002, 2a. 
2 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 4.2 (2013)  JUST 
Proclus (412-485 AD), as well as Abhinavagupta (ca 950-1020 AD), Utpaladeva (ca 
900-950 AD), and Kṣemarāja (ca 975-1125 AD). Comparative studies of the monistic 
schools of Greece and India are not new. To name at least one classical study on the 
topic, let us mention Advaita and Neoplatonism by the Dutch Indologist J.F. Staal, 
which compares Neoplatonism with Advaitavedānta of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya. As far as I 
know, however, there has been no focused attempt to compare Neoplatonism with 
Paramādvaita (supreme Advaita),2  a branch of Indian non-dualism (Advaita) that 
originated in Kashmir, in the very north west corner of India. As the reader will see, 
Paramādvaita is in many respects a more promising comparandum3 than any other 
monistic school of India. Its essential stress on the dynamic aspect of the absolute 
makes it a far more suitable, but yet unexplored, comparandum to Neoplatonic 
monism, which is also a dynamic system rather than a static hierarchy. The conscious 
and reasoned choice of the Paramādvaita as a suitable comparandum to 
Neoplatonism is thus a primary scientific contribution of this paper. 
 In the introduction, I will briefly introduce Indo-Greek comparative studies with a 
focus on monistic schools, and summarize the discussion of the “Oriental hypothesis” 
of the origin of Neoplatonic philosophy. Although the search for such “influence” 
brought few substantial consequences, it provoked a detailed study of both Greek and 
Indian monistic systems and forced scholars on both sides to clearly formulate the 
essence of these systems; it thereby accidentally contributed to the establishment of 
comparative philosophy as such. 
 Next, I will present both Neoplatonism and Paramādvaita as dynamic monisms. 
The focus will be on the dynamic notions of both systems, such as those of creative 
outflow (prohodos) and return (epistophe), and, on the Neoplatonic side, the doctrine 
of the absolute as a power (to hen = dynamis panton), as well as, on the side of the 
Paramādvaita, notions of prakāśa - vimarśa or the doctrine of the essential non-
difference of a power and its possessor (śaktiśaktimatorabhedatā). I shall also 
consider the general context of the above-mentioned insights, which is a doctrine of 
the self-established (svataḥsiddha, authypostaton) absolute, which is again present in 
doctrines of both schools. 
In the third section, I will detail similarities between the two systems under study, 
such as the doctrines of All in All and multi-levelled subjectivity, as well as some 
parallel aesthetic doctrines. I consciously declined to search for historical influences 
from both directions (although they are definitely not impossible) and so my 
arguments are based only on structural analogies.  
Some further implications of the high degree of compatibility of both systems will 
be discussed in the fourth section. Although this article does not aim to resurrect the 
old discussion of the possible oriental influence on Plotinus and his philosophy, its 
conclusions might nevertheless provoke a deep reconsideration of it. This would 
perhaps attract not only the attention of philosophers, but of historians as well. Even 
                                                 
2 However, the Italian scholar Raniero Gnoli has reported some resemblance within the aesthetic 
doctrines of Neoplatonism and Paramādvaita. (Gnoli 1956, 47). 
3 Comparandum used in the sense of participium necessitatis, i.e. what “is to be compared” or “what 
shall be compared.” 
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if we strictly insist on methodological abstraction from the question of influence, the 
conclusions of the article might provoke another highly interesting question: whether 
the similarities in these systems might be explained on a structural basis, namely by 
an inevitable interaction of a metaphysical notion of substance with a devastating 
sceptical critique.  
 
1. FROM THE ORIENTAL HYPOTHESIS TO COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
 
The debate over the possible Eastern – namely Indian, Persian or Egyptian – 
influences on the philosophy of Plotinus, the founder of the Neoplatonic School, 
continued throughout the 20
th
 century. Since this debate has been summarized 
brilliantly at least twice,
4
 I feel no need to add to it. Instead, I will discuss some points 
related to our research which I think should not go without discussion.  
The early formulation of the Oriental Hypothesis of the origin of Plotinus’ philosophy 
depended on the presupposition of “Pure Hellenicity”, which was to consist in 
rationality, clarity, and a sense of measurement or even “objectivity” in a proto-
positivist sense. Plotinus was subsequently thought not to fit in this frame, for at least 
two reasons:  
 First, his philosophy is subjective in its essence. Not only did he base all his 
philosophical conclusions on his own living experience, including his personal 
“merging in One”, but in a way he was also the founder of the very notion of 
subjectivity in the western world. Second, in his doctrine of the absolute he 
abandoned the Hellenistic ideal of beauty consisting in the harmony of proportions in 
favour of the ideal of an absolute of unbounded power, the power of all (dynamis 
panton). The Neoplatonic absolute is the ultimate source of all harmonic proportions 
in beautiful things and the beauty is therefore not reducible to them. The 
philosopher’s ascent towards the absolute is thus a way to the “beautiful beyond 
beautiful”, to the source of beauty creating power.5 
 The history of the rise and fall of the Oriental Hypothesis is hence the history of 
the rise and fall of the presupposition of pure “rational” Hellenicity. Enormous work 
has been done in the history of antique philosophy since the 1950s, of which we must 
at least mention E. R. Dodds.
6
 Additionally, the pre-history of the Neoplatonic school 
itself, the middle platonic school, has been attentively researched and closely 
described since that time.
7
  
 The French antique-philosophy scholar E. Brehier, who identifies the source of 
the “foreign element” in Plotinus as the teaching of the Indian Upanishads,8 was an 
earnest advocate of the Oriental Hypothesis. Brehier’s conclusions were opposed by 
A.H. Armstrong in his article “Plotinus and India”9 where he argues that even if we 
                                                 
4 Wolters 1982, 293-309; Staal 1961, 235-246. 
5 Enn. V.8.8. 
6 Dodds 1953. 
7 E.g. Merlan 1953, Dodds 1928. 
8 Brehier, 1936,  116-118. 
9 Armstrong 1936, 22-28. 
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accept Brehier’s view on Plotinus, there is no need to go as far as India or even to 
leave the Greek world to find its predecessors. So although the Indian influence on 
Plotinus is not “absolutely impossible”, its postulation is methodologically doubtful. 
Yet there is another phase of the Oriental hypothesis that partially leaves aside the 
concept of “Pure Hellenicity” and focuses on the texts themselves: this phase is 
perhaps best represented by another French scholar, J. Filliozat. His method consists 
of a close reading of given Greek and Indian philosophical or medical texts to search 
for mutual parallels, with a subsequent discussion of their cultural and historical 
contexts.  
 The aforesaid focus on the texts themselves brings another shift in the discussion 
and gives birth to the establishment of Indo-Greek comparative studies, wherein the 
question of historical influence is usually set aside in favour of seeking structural or 
doctrinal parallels of the two systems. In these attempts, however, Neoplatonism 
generally maintains its role as the Greek comparandum to the Indian systems, beside 
the sceptic school which is often compared to some branches of Mahāyāna  
Buddhism.  
 The key early contributions to such comparative studies include, in my opinion, 
J.F. Staal’s monograph Advaita and Neoplatonism and Indologist P. Hacker’s Cit and 
Nous in Advaita and Neoplatonism.
10
 In subsequent part of this paper I will take up 
some of their ideas, but let me first mention some points of disagreement as well.  
 In his work, Staal sees an essential difference between Advaita and Neoplatonism 
in their notions of the absolute: whereas the absolute of Neoplatonism is a potential 
infinity, the absolute of Advaita is an actual infinity.
11
 But in fact, these claims fail to 
describe reality better than their opposite.
12
 At the very least, the absolute of both 
Neoplatonism and the Paramādvaita branch of Advaita is a dynamic and pulsing one: 
from the pole of potential infinity to the pole of actuality and back again – as we will 
see in the subsequent parts of this paper and as an attentive reader of the texts of both 
traditions can see for himself. This dynamic, living, pulsing absolute is the very core 
of the teaching of both traditions, and any comparison which avoids this fact on either 
side of its comparandum is missing an important point of its subject.  
 Stall’s supporting argument for the potential infinity of the Neoplatonic absolute 
is the Greeks’ traditional fear of the formless and unlimited. This may be true for 
Hellenes in general, but it is quite doubtful for Plotinus, who “argues in terms 
shocking for traditional Hellenic thinkers as the source of Form, Measure and Limit, 
the One must itself be Formless, Unmeasured, and Infinite”. 13  We see this, for 
example, in VI.7. where the beauty in beautiful things is characterised as the 
splendour of the Good, while the measurable symmetry just as its “by-product”.14 
Thus the core of Staal’s misunderstanding is the very claim of an “actual” or 
                                                 
10 Staal 1962, Hacker 1977. 
11 Staal 1961, 181.  
12 See e.g., The One is all things (in a transcendent mode): Enn. V.2.1.2., VI.8.18.32-41. The One as 
pure act: Enn. VI.37.15-16,VI.9.6.50-5. 
13 See Wallis 1972,  57. 
14 Enn. VI.7.22.21-24. See also Hadot 1993, Ch.IV. 
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“potential” character of anything in Neoplatonism, since its clear doctrine is that 
everything is actual in itself while potential in all other things.
15
  
 Although I appreciate the clarity of P. Hacker’s argument, where he putatively 
identifies the Advaitic cit (consciousness) with the Neoplatonic nous (intellect), I 
disagree with one conclusion of his paper, where he over-evaluates the 
Advaitavedānta notion of an empty, absolute, pure reflectivity as embodied in the 
notion of cit, and on this basis compares it with the Neoplatonic nous, which, being a 
complexity of forms, is neither absolutely “empty” nor “pure”. From such a 
perspective, Neoplatonic teachings look like an imperfect step towards an aim that is 
perfected in Advaitavedānta. And on this point, I must express disagreement: 
Neoplatonism certainly knows the notion of an empty, absolutely pure subjectivity, as 
does our suggested comparandum the Paramādvaita, but both avoid making it the 
basis of the system for sound, well-argued reasons.
16
 Briefly summarized, the 
absolute of the above mentioned school is a living one; as such, it cannot be treated 
only as a reflective “emptiness” for it is simultaneously a creative “fullness”.  
Let me make one final note on the putative identity of the Advaitic cit cited above, 
and the Neoplatonic nous. The very possibility of establishing such an identity and of 
receiving meaningful outputs is opened by the non-obvious common base of both 
traditions, which lies in metaphors common to both systems, and which can be 
founded in their older referential strata, i.e. the Upanishads on the side of Advaita and 
the Corpus Platonicum on the side of Neoplatonism. 
 Let me now select just one parallel, perhaps the most striking one. It is a common 
metaphoric basis of the notion of Soul. In the referential strata of both traditions, we 
find the metaphor of Soul as a composite of yoke of horses and chariot with driver. 
The horses represents the passionate or sensible part of the Soul, yoked to a vehicle of 
                                                 
15 See also Section 3.1 of this article. 
16  The topos of śūnyatā is considered in the Paramādvaita point of view, for example, in 
commentaries to SK 12-13. Sp.S. (Transl. Singh, 1980,76): “The Supreme Lord himself, in order to 
conceal real knowledge, shows fools void as reality so that they may accept it as the goal to be 
achieved.” 
 Kallaṭa writes in his vṛtti: abhilāpasaṃyogāt sā śūnyāvasthā atītā mama iti smaryate, na ca 
ātmasvabhāva eṣaḥ, yasmāt na tvevaṃ cidrūpatvaṃ mūḍhāvasthāvat smaryate, tasya 
sarvakālamanubhavitṛtvenānubhavo nityoditatvāt (MBDL, line 1201-3.) 
 When the state of śūnya is being remembered as an experience “that happened to me” as in any 
other case of continuity of experience, it cannot be the nature of ātman, since this nature is not 
something that could be remembered, such is the case of empty (and therefore) unconscious experience 
because at any time of experience there is an experiencer of it. 
 For the fullness of principle of Intellect in Plotinus, see e.g. Enn.V.3.5.40-45:οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς 
οὗτος δυνάμει οὐδ' ἕτερος μὲν αὐτός, ἡ δὲ νόησις ἄλλο· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάλιν τὸ οὐσιῶδες αὐτοῦ δυνάμει. 
Εἰ οὖν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἂν εἴη· ἓν δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ὂν καὶ 
τὸ νοητόν· ἓν ἅμα πάντα ἔσται, νοῦς, νόησις, τὸ νοητόν  
 “... For that primal principle is no potentiality and cannot be an agent distinct from its act and 
thus, once more, possessing its essential being as a mere potentiality. As an act - and one whose 
very being is an act - it must be indistinguishably identical with its act.” Transl. Kenna 1969, 324 . 
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the psycho-physical body, where the real core of the Soul is the driver, the charioteer: 
the very top of intellectual part  the Soul.
17
  
 I do not feel the need to further stress the striking presence of such parallel topos 
in the core of the textual base of both systems. In my opinion, its very fact is eloquent 
enough. Even the broader appeal of this metaphor is the same in both systems: to 
show that hegemony over the sensual and passionate parts of the soul-body vehicle is 
gained by sustained knowledge and training, whose mastery is symbolized in the 
metaphor of the yoke in the hand of the charioteer. As far as I know, this metaphor is 
rarely, if ever, used as a basis of a philosophic comparison, although it would 
definitely deserve close attention. 
 
2. THE ESSENTIAL DYNAMIC NATURE OF  
NEOPLATONISM  AND PARAMĀDVAITA 
 
2.1 NEOPLATONISM  AS A DYNAMIC MONISM 
 
In Plato’s Sophist, there is a passage discussing the nature of being. It starts from the 
usual platonic difference of unstable becoming belonging to bodies, and of being 
belonging to the Intellect and Soul. From this preliminary step it would appear that 
the sphere of being is devoid of any motion at all and, as surprised Plato shows, 
therefore of life as well. But this contradicts the general platonic intuitions about the 
nature of God and the absolute, namely, that this is not only a culmination of being 
but also of beauty, considered as a living creative force. Thus in Sophistes, before he 
admits motion and life in the sphere of being, the Stranger puts a rhetorical question:  
 
But for heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves be easily persuaded that motion and life and 
soul and mind are not really present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but 
awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?
18
  
 
Plotinus explored this thought quite extensively. The absolute, and to some extension 
also all other subsequent levels emanating from it, is endowed with power, whose 
first characteristic is life. The Intellect of Enneads is “boiling with life”19 and later 
Neoplatonists made this life of the Intellect an outflowing phase of a trinity, the 
Intellects’ self-establishing movement (Being-Life-Intellect).20  
 An important remark should be made about the relationship of this power to its 
source. It is not just an arbitrary quality of a given substance, but an essential 
characteristic, which is, according to Plato, a quality defining its holder in such a 
substantial way that he would “either go away or vanish” if somehow it could be 
taken away from him, as it happens e.g. with snow and fire.
21
 The very same thought, 
                                                 
17 Corpus Platonicum: Phdr. 246A6-7,  Upanishads: KathUp.III.3, Radhakrishnan 1994, 246. 
18 Soph. 248e-249a. (Tr. by Fowler, 1921.) 
19 Enn .V.5.12.9. 
20 See ET.103. Also: In Tim. I.371.15-25. 
21 Phaed.100c-104c. 
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using the same simile of snow and fire, is used by Plotinus when he describes the 
power of the One:  
 
Even lifeless objects impart something of themselves, as far as they may; fire warms, 
snow chills, drugs have their own outgoing efficacy; all things to the utmost of their 
power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service. How then 
could the most perfect, the First Good, remain in itself, as if it is grudged to give of itself, 
or was impotent (adynaton), when it is the productive power of all things?
22 
 
 The One of the Plotinian system, perfect and self-sufficient, is endowed with 
power, overflowing from its source and creating subsequent levels.
23
 First so created 
is the Intellect, which is fully established only when it turns back contemplatively 
towards its source, the One. In the same way, the Intellect creates a last self-
established substance, the Soul, which is again established as such only after its turns 
back to its source, the Intellect. The first phase of this creative circular movement is 
thus a kind of formless outflow, whereas the second phase is self-forming perfection 
by backwards movement towards its own source. This attempt fails for structural 
reasons, but leads to self-reflection, which is a perfection of self-establishing 
movement. The first of these phases is poetically called Intellect in love, whereas the 
second Contemplating Intellect.
24
 This movement of creation cannot stop until it 
reaches the level of matter, which is incapable creating anything further.
25
 
 Plotinus treated the aforesaid cyclical, hypostatical movement using two technical 
terms: unformed procession (prohodos) and forming return (epistrophe). This became 
part of the generally accepted Plotinian heritage in later Neoplatonism, which adds a 
third phase of “remaining in itself” (mone) thus forming a trinity of remaining – 
procession – return. This would become a universally applied triadic pattern for 
establishing different levels of the increasingly complex system of late Neoplatonism. 
Even if we focused on nothing but the dynamics described by procession and return, 
the dynamic character of Neoplatonism would nevertheless be revealed in all its 
fullness and clarity.  
 One can perhaps make an objection about the essential dynamic nature of the first 
principle, the One. Can this principle be called dynamic when by definition it is 
single? The answer should take the structure of the system into account. Evolution 
does not take place outside the One but inside it. Moreover, as we shall see in the 
following part, the Plotinian system is holistic, which means that the higher principle 
is present within its evolute, in accord with its mode. The one in us is, in its own way, 
the One, the power of all, much in the same way as the individual Soul has a potential 
to be her sister, the world Soul, and both have the potential to ascend to their 
undescendened source, the Intellect. 
                                                 
22 Enn. V.4.1.34-5. (Tr. by Armstrong, unless indexed otherwise)  
23 Enn.V.2.1.7 
24 Enn.VI.7,35 
25 Enn.IV.8.6. V.2.2. See Wallis 1972, 65. 
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 This radical holism was criticised by later Neoplatonists, as was the metaphysical 
optimism about the nature of the human Soul, which is in its upper part undescended 
and eternally seated in the Intellect. But the pulsating creative character of the 
absolute, including the two subsequent self-constituted emanating levels of Intellect 
and Soul, was accepted and left untouched, at least as a basic structure that can 
nevertheless undergo further divisions increasing its complexity. Thus Proclus 
summarizes the creating process of all self established levels (authypostasis) : 
“Whatever is complete proceeds to generate those things which it is capable of 
producing, imitating in its turn the one originative principle of the universe.”26 And, 
“Everything originally self-moving is capable of reversion upon itself.”27 
 
2.2  PARAMĀDVAITA AS A DYNAMIC MONISM 
  
By the term Paramādvaita, we refer to the non-dual teaching of Kashmiri Śaivism as 
it culminated in the schools of Pratyabhijñā (recognition, specifically of one’s own 
divine nature) and Spanda (vibration, specifically of consciousness) as it was 
summarized in the work of Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja.  
 The schools of Pratyabhijñā and Spanda developed a theory of an essentially 
dynamic, pulsing absolute, in contrast to the motionless “pure mind only” absolute of 
Advaitavedānta and some Mahāyāna Buddhist schools. To understand this notion of a 
dynamic absolute, we must first consider how pulsation is the very base of it. The 
static and dynamic poles of reality are usually treated as God, the possessor of power 
(śaktimān), and his power (śakti), respectively. In most philosophic systems 
connected with mainstream orthodox Hinduism, the relation of these two poles is a 
hierarchy with God, the static masculine pole of reality on the top. But the 
Paramādvaita schools are, in fact, a philosophical output of tantric Hinduism wherein 
the dynamic feminine aspect of reality is valued much more highly, and thus power  
is equal to, or even higher than its subject, which is defined by it. The absolute of the 
tantric systems is not the culmination of purity, but the culmination of power.
28
 
Freedom, as a characteristic of the absolute of such a system, is not empty apophatic 
“freedom from”, as in e.g. Sāmkhya or Advaitavedānta, but active kataphatic, 
“freedom to”.  
 The first rule to be remembered when talking about the Paramādvaita notion of 
the dynamic absolute is the doctrine of the essential non-difference of power and its 
holder (śaktiśaktimatorabheditatva). At this point, we again occasionally encounter 
the “platonic” simile of the essential oneness of heat and fire or cold and snow. 29 In 
Pratyabhijñā kārikā we read:  
 
The very life of insentient beings is based on sentient ones. The life of sentient beings is 
considered as the power of knowledge (jñāna) and the power of a creative act (kriyā). Of 
                                                 
26 ET 25 Dodds, 1963, 19. 
27 ET 17 Dodds, 1963, 29. 
28 See Sanderson 1985. 
29 V.Bh. 18-19a 
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them, the power of knowledge is self-established (svataḥ siddhaṃ) seated in a body with 
power to act.
30
 
 
 This power of knowledge projects the content of mind as in a dream or within the 
visions of yogins.
31
 In fact, this creative power is Śiva, the absolute, who – even in an 
embodied being – never ceases the five characteristic activities (pañcakṛtya) of 
creating, maintaining, destroying, concealing and revealing.
32
 As an embodied being, 
he does so by creating, etc., the content of mind in the creative sequence (krama) of 
conscious flow.
33
 But this creative activity is no illusion, the mental content it creates 
is by no means unreal, as is the māyā of Advaitavedānta despite the fact that both 
schools hold the doctrine that “everything is mind only”.34 Rather, the created world 
is a real product of will (icchā) and creative potential (kriyā), which are both 
expressions of the freedom (svatantrya) of the absolute. This is the “realistic” aspect 
of Paramādvaita. It is a natural consequence of the paradoxical doctrine of the fully 
uncompromised transcendence within the fully uncompromised immanence 
(sarvamaya - sarvottīrṇa) of Śiva.35In fact, nothing that is not of the nature of the 
light of consciousness can ever enter it. To be is to have the nature of consciousness
36
 
and so there is no need for the separate categories of Sat and Cit as in 
Advaitavedānta.  
 The dynamic nature of the absolute, which even occurs within a single cognitive 
act of man, imprisoned as he is in the unstable stream of relative being (saṃsāra), is 
described in Pratyabhijñā by the notions of prakāśa, the light of projecting 
awareness, and vimarśa, the light of reflective awareness.37 The point of Pratyabhijñā 
is that if, as in most other systems e.g., Advaitavedānta, the absolute is light only, 
sans the pole of reflective awareness, it would then be a lifeless entity, e.g. a crystal 
or a lamp.
38  
                                                 
30 tathā hi jaḍabhūtānāṃ pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā, jñānaṃ kriyā ca bhūtānāṃ jīvatāṃ jīvanaṃ matam, 
tatra jñānaṃ svataḥ siddhaṃ kriyā kāyāśritā satī. (IPK I.1.3-4.) 
31 cidātmaiva hi devo’ntaḥ sthitamicchāvaśādbahiḥ | yogīva nirupādānamarthajātaṃ prakāśayet (IPK 
I.5.7.) 
32  IPK I.6.7.(tadevaṃ vyavahāre'pi prabhurdehādimāviśan | bhāntamevāntararthaughamicchayā 
bhāsayed bahiḥ) also Sp.S.: evaṃ ca vyākhyāte sati yat pañcavidhakṛtyakāritvaṃ 
śrīsvacchandādiśāstreṣu parameśvarasya ucyate Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 292. 
33  The doctrine of vibrating consciousness in sequence of sense perception is another jewel of 
Paramādvaita, its exposition would extend this article beyond a reasonable limit. For further readings, 
see: TS. IV.Ah. 29, l.1-4,. KSTS.,TA IV. 121-189., Sanderson, 1990, 681-685. 
34 SKV 29.: ..manmayameva jagat sarvaṃ. (For him everything is just a play, who knows that...) 
Everything is of the nature of mind only...   
35 SKV 55.:  ...sarvottīrṇacinmātraviṣayo viśvamayaśakticakraviṣayaśca... The transcendent aspect 
(of Śiva) is pure consciousness; whereas the immanent is the circle of energies, see SK 1.1. below. 
36 IPVV: I. 220: astitvaṃ prakāśamānatvameva. For further references on parmādvaita ontology see 
Torrela 1994, 15-20. Dyczkowski 1989, 51-57. 
37 In depicting vimarśa as ‘reflective awareness’, I follow the translation of R.Torella, which seems to 
me much more accurate than e.g. K.C.Pandeys’ ‘freedom’. Still it is to be remembered that vimarśa 
although “reflective” is an active power! That is why sometimes it is called e.g. intuition (pratibhā). 
38  IPK.I.5.11. svabhāvamavabhāsasya vimarśaṃ viduranyathā | prakāśo'rthoparakto'pi 
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 In the Spanda school, we find a declaration of the dynamic nature of its absolute 
in its very first line: the basic text, the Spandakārikā, begins with the verse: “That 
one, which by opening and closing of eyelids, is creating and destroying the world 
and who is the lord of the circle of powers, we praise.”39 As commentators have 
explained, the opening (unmeṣa) and closing (nimeṣa) of eyelids are technical terms 
of creative expansion and contraction of consciousness, which is called spanda (the 
throb, vibration). The source of the universe is never without this power (na 
tvaspandaḥ).40 Lets note that  the general context of such creative pulsating process is 
again self-creation (svataḥsiddhatva), since there is nothing outside absolute 
(ekaśivatā).41 
 One of the original points of the Spanda teaching is that expansion and 
contraction take place simultaneously: the expansion of the universal consciousness is 
just another side of the contraction of a particular saṃsārical consciousness and vice 
versa.
42
 This vibration goes on, not only in the great cycles of creation (sṛṣṭi), 
maintenance (sthiti) and withdrawal (saṃhṛti) of the universe, but also in each 
cognitive act, each single thought followed by another throughout our daily 
saṃsārical activity. Thus according to both of these schools, Śiva, the dynamic 
absolute, is uncompromised in his freedom, even while present at the very core of our 
individual Soul, where he performs his essential activities. The task of human 
existence is thus to realize that our innermost nature (svasvabhāva) is identical with 
the universal creative nature of the absolute and therefore, in an ultimate sense, free.
43  
Although this all sounds much like the Upanishadic dictum on the identity of the 
human Soul (ātman) with the universal principle of existence (brahman), it fills this 
old form with new content, stressing the essential dynamic nature of both, in fact 
identical, principles.  
 
3. SOME CORRESPONDING DOCTRINES OF  
NEOPLATONISM  AND PARAMĀDVAITA 
 
3.1 ALL IS IN ALL 
 
As we have seen in 2.1, the dynamism of the Neoplatonic One is carried through on 
each level of its hierarchy. On every level, it is realized by the phase of out-flowing 
potency, which subsequently turns towards its source thus creating itself in its fully 
formed shape. The ultimate source of this potency is the Neoplatonic absolute, the 
                                                                                                                                           
sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ  Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 8037. 
39  SK I.1. yasyonmeṣanimeṣābhyāṁ jagataḥ pralayodayau | taṁ śakticakravibhavaprabhavaṁ 
śaṁkaraṁ stumaḥ || 
40 SpN, Singh, (1980), 6. 
41 See n. 30 and 55. 
42 Sp.S. p. 9 (KSTS). Cit. in: Dyczkowski 1987, 61. 
43 satyam, paramārthato na kaścid bandhaḥ kevalaṃ svasmādanuttarāt svātantryāt yadā svātmānaṃ 
saṃkucitamavabhāsayati sa eva IPVV, Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 23821. 
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One, but its self-creative power is “delegated” to all subsequently created levels of 
Intellect and Soul. 
  Every ontological level is thus in its own way present on a lower plane, which is 
again in its own turn present on a higher one. Generally summed up by Proclus: 
everything exists as a cause (kat’ aitian) on its higher level, as a substance on its own 
level, (kat’ hyparxin) and as a participated unity (kata metexin) on the subsequent 
lower level.
44
 
 The mutual presence of all in all is not limited to the vertical axis of the 
Neoplatonic system, but is present on each self-established level. The paradigmatic 
level on which Plotinus develops his doctrine of the holistic interconnection, and even 
interpenetration, of everything with everything else is the Intellect.  
 
...each part (of Intellect) whichever one you take, is all things, but perhaps in different 
ways. For it is actually one thing, but it has power to be all....
45 
 
 In his contemplative manual describing the epistemic structure of the Intellect, he 
writes: 
 
Let us, then, make a mental picture of our universe: each member shall remain what it is, 
distinctly apart; yet all is to form, as far as possible, a complete unity so that whatever 
comes into view shall show as if it were the surface of the orb over all, bringing 
immediately with it the vision, on the one plane, of the sun and of all the stars with earth 
and sea and all living things as if exhibited upon a transparent globe.
46
 
 
In this way he stresses, in a wonderful mental experiment, the mutual 
interconnectivity and interpenetration in the intellectual realm. But even on the level 
of the Soul we can find traces of this mutual interpenetration, as we can see in the 
case of language or of science, where each sentence only makes sense when we take 
into consideration the whole of the language or of science, i.e., in all other possible 
sentences of a given system.
47
 The border of mutual interpenetration is within the 
Soul, as it copies the line of the presence of logos; and so only the lowest, most 
irrational part of her, the alogon of an individual Soul and the fyzis (nature) of the 
world Soul, are characterized by mutual exclusion, which we can observe e.g. in solid 
objects. This corresponds to the general Neoplatonic doctrine of a gradual limitation 
of the Absolute. Wherein logical difference belongs to and limits the Intellect, time 
difference belongs to and limits the Soul, and the spatial difference belongs to and 
limits the body.
48
 
 Plotinus’s holism reaches its peak in VI.4. In this essay, he examines the topic of 
immanence: in what way the Intellect is present within us? Does it do so by a kind of 
                                                 
44 Enn. III.4. Summarized by Proclus in ET. 65. 
45 Enn. VI.7.9.33-35. 
46 Enn. V.8.9. Kenna 1969, 361. 
47 Enn. V.8.4., V.9.8.  
48 We can find a parallel doctrine of a voluntary limitation of the Absolute in Paramādvaita, where 
the gradual limitation is done by six “hazes” (kāñcuka) of the Absolute, see IPK+IPKV, III.2.4-19.  
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gleam it creates on a lower level of Soul with itself remaining on its own higher plane 
– or is it present in all its mighty power and splendour wherever it exists, even at its 
creation? In VI.4., Plotinus’s answer favours the latter. 49  The true “All”, i.e. the 
Intellect, cannot be bereft of its power, even when it is present on a lower ontological 
plane, i.e. the Soul.
50
 The same thought can be applied even to the One itself, thus 
leaving the Plotinian system devoid of hierarchy in favour of strict holism. The 
human Soul can thus travel to the intellectual realm, which she in fact has never left 
(the doctrine of the undescended Soul) and can even, rarely, (Plotinus himself 
succeeded but a few times) reach oneness with the top of the hierarchy, the One. 
 The mature formulation of holism in the Neoplatonic school is All is in all but 
each according to the mode of its own existence.
51
 The stress on the first part of the 
maxim is peculiar to some holistic tendencies in Plotinus’ thinking, whereas the stress 
on the second, and corrective half, is peculiar to the later Neoplatonism of Proclus, 
who made the system more rigid and the borders between its levels firmer and 
clearer, but also impenetrable. According to Plotinus, the levels of ontological 
hierarchy correspond to the philosopher’s stages of mind, whereas according to 
Proclus, they rather correspond to all possible logical differences.  
 Let us now turn our attention to the Paramādvaita, where we also find a maxim 
on the mutual interpenetrative presence of all in all (sic!). The verbatim it is: 
“everything is of the nature of everything” (sarvaṃ sarvamayam). In Paramādvaitic 
texts, it appears as a traditional saying of the school. I have encountered this maxim 
here and there in the texts of Paramādvaitic schools, mostly in commentaries of 
Kṣemarāja and Abhinavagupta. I still have no clear understanding of its origin and 
prehistory,
52
 but I guess that it is a part of a large cluster of Mahāyāna-Buddhist 
doctrines inherited by Paramādvaitic authors, of which some were refuted, some 
reworked, and some simply taken over.
53
 
 The maxim is not only nearly identical to the translation of the Greek pasa en 
pasin, but its doctrinal context is also quite similar. In his commentary to SK 1, 
Kṣemarāja describes Spanda, the creative pulse of Śiva, as the absolute. It is a wave 
of consciousness that proceeds from the purest and ontologically highest levels to the 
level of everyday saṃsāric existence and back. According to Kṣemarāja, Śiva in his 
freedom, expands “in the process of gradual descent. (He) displays by way of 
playfully concealing his inner nature, the succeeding aspect by suppressing preceding 
ones”.54 Then he returns again by giving up concealment to reach his higher form, in 
an interplay of expanding and contracting consciousness. So, in this way “he shows 
                                                 
49 Thus being one of the strongest criticisms of emanation metaphoristics, which is otherwise used in 
some places in Enneads. 
50 Πᾶν δὴ τὸ πᾶν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἀπολείπεται ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔστι τε πεπληρωκὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ὂν ἴσον 
ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὗ τὸ πᾶν, ἐκεῖ αὐτό· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν αὐτό ἐστιν. Enn. VI.4.2.15. 
51 ET 103, Dods, 1933, 93. For the history of the maxim, see also ibid, p. 254. 
52 For some suggestions see Torella  2002, 15, fn. 12. 
53 Many of these interactions are described in R.Torella’s notes to Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā and vṛtti 
(Torella 2002). The actual identity of the Buddhist doctrine sarvaṃ sarvamayam and the Neoplatonic 
pasa en pasin is already noticed and discussed in Evilley 2002, 576-579. 
54 Sp.N. 11, Transl. In Singh, 1980.  
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everything as of the nature of everything else”. It should be said that the mutual 
interpenetration described by the maxim in the Paramādvaita is just another face of 
the doctrine that Everything is Śiva (ekaśivatā).55 
 In Abhinavagupta’s Paratrīśikavivaraṇa, we again find the maxim everything has 
the character of everything, but here it is in a linguistic context. As with Plotinus, 
language (logos) is a platform where interconnection of all is seen most clearly by us 
as human beings. Influenced by tantric speculations on the nature of speech (vāc), 
Abhinavagupta uses a slightly different strategy. Thus, in the example of the sentence 
‘I, Mr. X.Y., am speaking’, he shows that the subject of the sentence is in a way 
objectified, and is in fact thereby of a mixed nature: that of the first grammatical 
person (I) and that of the third (He). And again, in the sentence ‘Listen to me, O 
mountains’ the grammatical form is the second person (You), but in fact the 
assumptive listener is an object, as it is of the nature of the third grammatical person 
(It). This is according to tantric doctrines wherein, grammatically speaking, the first 
person belongs to Śiva (God), the second to Śakti (power) and the third to nara 
(human). All is in a way mixed on the level of language, which is, according to 
Paramādvaitic doctrines adopted from the grammarian Bhartṛhari, the basic level of 
any experience at all. 
 Another adopted Bhartṛharian doctrine is that of the fourfold speech: the 
transcendental (parā), the intuitive (paśyantī), the mental (madhyamā) and the voiced 
(vaikharī), a doctrine that can also serve as a basis of exposition of the maxim 
everything has the character of everything. Though we use voiced (spoken) speech in 
everyday communication, any such event of creating or understanding a sentence also 
puts our inner mental speech to use. And to do this, we use intuitive speech, which is 
an outflow of the supreme level of speech, the parā.  
  There is also a quite surprising parallel between the doctrine of multi-levelled 
creative speech in Neoplatonism (logos) and Paramādvaita (vāc), but for brevity’s 
sake no independent part  will be dedicated to this topic in this article. Abhinavagupta 
demonstrates that the Spandic pulse of consciousness, from pure content-less 
consciousness (nirvikalpa saṃvid) to a workaday consciousness with a fully 
developed content (savikalpa saṃvid) and back, can also be described as the pulse of 
speech. Each part of this consciousness/speech chain has all the others hidden within, 
in a contracted form, itself being the open expanded form of its own kind. 
 The very same playful game of concealing and revealing of the form in the pulse 
of creative flow can be found in both Paramādvaita and Neoplatonism. The higher 
level in the pulse of prohodos and epistrophe contains its lower evolutes in its hidden 
(krifyos) form as cause (kat aitian); the lower level is the openly revealed (adiakrifos) 
potency of the higher and vice versa.
56
 It is a doctrine we have already met, e.g. in 
                                                 
55 SK 29: tasmācchabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yaḥ śivaḥ.  
56 TP, III.39.20-24: “plurality is in first members hidden and uncovered, in subsequent members 
already openly uncovered, as much as something is closer to the One, that much it hides and covers its 
plurality and itself is trying to take the form of oneness” (Ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ κρυφίως μέν ἐστι καὶ 
ἀδιακρίτως ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, διῃρημένως δὲ ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις· ὅσῳ γάρ ἐστι τῷ ἑνὶ τὸ ὂν 
συγγενέστερον, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον ἀποκρύπτει τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν μόνον ἀφορίζεται τὴν ἕνωσιν). 
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Section 1.2., “everything is itself in actual modus while all other things in potential 
modus”. 
 
3.2 MULTILEVELLED SUBJECTIVITY 
 
Plotinus made the very concept of the conscious ‘we’ a philosophical problem for the 
first time in the history of the Western philosophical tradition, thereby discovering 
subjectivity for the Western world. He was the first Greek philosopher to 
systematically reflect the fact that our ‘we’ is a non-obvious, multilevelled entity, 
which varies with time and circumstances.
57
 Roughly expressed: the Soul’s actual 
state is determined by what she contemplats.
58
 R.T. Wallis sums it up by quoting 
Plotinus: “from the dynamic standpoint ‛we’ are identical with the level to which we 
give most attention”.59  
 Plotinus was also the first to systematically observe the fact that there may be, and 
usually is, a long-term delay between emotionally charged experiences and their 
subsequent fruit. He identified two kinds of memory corresponding to judgement and 
the habitual reactivity of mind.
60
 In the same way in which the integrity of knowledge 
is actively mediated by Idea, a traditional topic of Platonism, Plotinus also turns his 
attention to personal integrity, which presupposes some higher kind of a conscious 
whole, which for Plotinus is Intellect. Whether or not we are aware of it, Intellect 
always “intelligizes”.61 Since one part of our Soul stays undescended62 in the Intellect, 
there is also one part of our personality that is always intellectually active whether or 
not we are aware of it. When we identify with this highest level of our personality we 
are only potentially, but not actually, our normal daily “we”.63 
 Sometimes, even our activities are not accompanied by normal daily awareness 
(antilepsis, parakolouthesis) but only by an immediate sense of the present moment 
(synaisthesis), and are performed spontaneously without the delay of discursive 
thinking, understanding, etc.
64
 This immediate presence in action is evaluated by 
Plotinus as a more “concentrated in itself” modus of being65 and characteristic of the 
way of wise man (spoudaios).
66
 
 Let us turn to the Paramādvaita at this point where we are advised to contemplate 
spontaneity as characteristic of the higher realms of being when it occurs in activities 
                                                                                                                                           
See R.Chlup, 2009 ,96. 
57 A classical passage is, e.g., Enn. VI.4.14.16; for further reading, see Hadot 1993, Ch. II., or Merlan 
1953, 77-84. 
58 Enn. IV.3.8.15 
59 Wallis, 1972, 72. 
60 Enn. IV.3.28. 
61  Originally an Aristotelian doctrine. On this base P. Merlan (Monopsychism Mysticism and 
Metaconsciousness) identifies that as a source of Plotinus’ doctrine of metaconsciousness.  
62 Enn. IV.8.8.1-6. 
63 Enn. IV.4.2.3. 
64 Enn. I.4.10.21. 
65 Enn. I.4.10.30-35. 
66 Ibid. 
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of our daily saṃsāric life. It is mostly in activities done spontaneously, with full 
focus, not reflected by discursive reason. In Spandakārikā we read: “Spanda is stable 
in the state one enters when extremely angry, intensely excited, running or wondering 
what to do.”67 The commentator adds, e.g., that running “refers by implication to all 
functions of the organs of action … including speech ... or when one sings or plays a 
flute”. 68  There are also numerous verses from a meditative manual of the 
Paramādvaita, the Vijñānabhairava, that refer to this practice, some of which are 
cited by commentators in connection with the aforesaid kārikā.69 
 As we stated in the introduction, we do not intend to search for “influences”. But 
let us say that the topic of multi-levelled subjectivity was at the centre of 
philosophical attention in India for centuries before Plotinus. And it reached 
conclusions very similar to Plotinus, which were developed in notions of saṃskāra 
(the memory trace of experience) and vāsana (its contracted form, empowered by 
direct influence on the behaviour of the mind) as tools for describing the 
determinative function of the unconscious mind, or notions of ātman (the Soul, in its 
highest most general form), buddhi (intellect), ahaṃkāra (the ego sense), manas 
(mind), as tools for describing the cognitive structure of consciousness from sense 
perception right up to the “metaconsciousness” of pure the reflectivity of ātman. All 
this was done long before the rise of the Paramādvaita and became a part of a 
common heritage of nearly every philosophical school of India.  
  Paramādvaita authors merely took some part of this heritage, although in some 
instances with some doctrinal adjustments. Thus, i.a. the overused ātman is 
sometimes replaced by a more dynamic and intimate “one’s own nature” (svabhāva). 
The enemy-number-one of all orthodox schools, the ego, was dichotomized into the 
artificial “I-ness” (kṛtrimā ahaṃtā) and pure “I-ness” (pūrṇāhaṃtā), where the 
former bears some characteristics of the old ahaṃkāra which should be dissolved by 
yogic practices, whereas the latter is, in fact, the subjective side of the absolute and 
therefore, in its way, the subjective top of the epistemico-ontological hierarchy. And 
yet, even the lower levels of subjectivity are not to be dissolved or destroyed if they 
are viewed with correct understanding (sat tarka), merely as a play (līlā, krīḍā) and 
an expression of the freedom (svatantra) of the absolute. In the ultimate sense 
(paramārthataḥ), nothing at all is to be destroyed (heya) in the Paramādvaita, as it is 
to be in classical yoga or in Advaitavedānta, and thus its authors could openly declare 
that their new path is easy.
70
  
  In fact, for each level of the Paramādvaita universe, there exists a correspondent 
subjective pole experiencing this level. The hierarchy of those subjects or observers 
goes from the ultimate observer (parāpramātṛ) through the void observer 
(śūnyapramātṛ), the observer of vital energy (prāṇapramātṛ) upward toward the 
bodily versed observer of the body in the world of illusion (dehapramātṛ, 
                                                 
67 SK, I.22. transl. Dyczkowski , 1992, 100. ...atikruddhaḥ prahṛṣṭo vā kiṃ karomīti vā mṛśan | 
dhāvan vā yatpadaṃ gacchet tatra spandaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ... 
68 Spandavivṛtti, Transl. in Dyczkowski, 1992,101. 
69 V.Bh. 101, 71, 118. Cited by Kṣemarāja in SpN, Singh, 1980, 103.  
70 IPK, IV.16: ...iti prakaṭito mayā sughaṭa eṣa mārgo navo mahāgurubhirucyatesma śivadṛṣṭiśāstre... 
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māyāpramātṛ). This hierarchy is perhaps best expressed by the groups of presiding 
observers
71
 at different levels of the Paramādvaita’s universe, parallel to the 
classifications of 36 Paramādvaitic categories (tattva) from Śiva, the absolute, to the 
everyday world of the senses and gross elements.  
  This doctrine of multi-levelled subjectivity, beside its doubtless contribution to 
psychology, also plays the role of an important regulative, which protects the system 
against the solipsist narcissism of single subject dreaming out its own world in both 
systems: In the wonderful play of creation, we are normally aware of and situated in 
our day-to-day consciousness. Its content is indeed projected by “us” but we are not 
usually aware of this fact because that projecting ‘us’ is operating on a far higher or 
deeper level than the level of our everyday consciousness.  
 
3.3 SOME PARALLEL DOCTRINES IN AESTHETICS 
 
Although “we” are in this way projecting “our” own content of consciousness, it is 
ever new for us and never ceases to surprise us. This characteristic is, according to the 
Paramādvaita, due to the spontaneous outflow of the power of creative intuition 
(pratibhā), which is another name for the dynamic reflectivity of consciousness 
(vimarśa). As with all other main activities of the absolute, it is ever present, even on 
the level of an embodied subject.
72
 Its presence can be observed in the human ability 
to create new things in a spontaneous outflow of mind, which finds its expression in 
play, poetry and the arts. Abhinavagupta defined this intuition as the “insight 
incessantly scintillating with ever new forms  It is by virtue of this intuition alone that 
one deserves the title of a poet.” 73   
  The ability of the absolute to come up with ever-new forms is responsible for 
wonder; in both Paramādvaita and Neoplatonism, wonder is the mood of the Soul 
ascending towards the absolute in a mystical vision. Wonder (ekplexis) in 
Neoplatonism is a terminus technicus for a passionate state generated in the Soul by 
the divine beauty of the Good. 
74
  
  
 The Soul, seeing the invisible as it were rejoices in itself, admires its appearing, and is 
astonished at it. And the mystics, in the most holy religious rites, before receiving 
mystical visions, are stricken with wonder, so in the realm of Intellect, the beautiful 
appears in advance, before communion with the good...
75
 
                                                 
71 Śiva, Mantreśvara, Mantramaheśvara, Vidyeśa, Vijñānākala, Pralayākala, Sakala. See TA, XV. 
15.341.  Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 4229-35. 
72  IPK, I.6.7. Also Sp.S.: ...māyāpramātṛbhūmāvapi parameśvarasya prakāśātmanaḥ idaṃ 
pañcavidhakṛtyakāritvaṃ sthitameva, pūrṇa tutatsaṃbandha sāvadhānavijñānaśālisaṃcetyam...  
73 ...prajñā navanavollekaśālinī pratibhā matā tadanuprāṇanājivadvarṇanānipunaḥ....Cit. in: Gnoli, 
1956, L. Thus Abhinavagupta is in aesthetics a strict intuitionist, same as Plotinus for whom the inner 
form (to endon eidos, Enn, I.6.3.8.) is responsible for both the creation and the reception of Beauty.  
74 See e.g. Enn. I.6.7. 18 or ŠSV Transl. In Singh 1980, 52. 
75 Proclus TP. 3.64.1-12 (TLG) ...πάντα σιγωμένην ἔχει καὶ ἀπόρρητον   τὴν ἔφεσιν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ καλὸν 
μετ' ἐκπλήξεως καὶ κινήσεως ἐγειρόμεθα. Τὸ γὰρ ἐκλάμπον αὐτοῦ καὶ δραστήριον ὀξέως διὰ πάσης 
χωρεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστρέφει θεωμένην τὸ καλὸν ὡς τῷ ἀγαθῷ πάντων ὁμοιότατον· καὶ τὸ 
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We find a description of this playful state in Enneads where the purified Soul of a 
philosopher oscillates between a complete unification with its ultimate subject and a 
partial departure from it. This leads to the state of wonder, which causes this 
unification again.
76
 It is described by similar terms in the Paramādvaita literal corpus 
e.g. by Śivasūtra: “The stations and stages of yoga constitute a fascinating wonder 
”.77 The commentator Kṣemarāja adds “As a person is stuck with wonder ... even so 
there is pleasant surprise for the great yogi who notices in mute wonder an expansion 
of his entire complex of senses, as they come fully under  the influence of the inner 
self,  which is a mass of consciousness and full of unique, pre-eminent, ever new 
delight.”78   
  There are two contradictory doctrines on the nature of worldly beauty in 
Neoplatonism, which extend as far as Plato’s work itself. One is entirely pessimistic 
about the presence of the Soul in the world of bodies as it considers the body to be the 
“grave of the Soul”. The other is more optimistic in this regard as it considers the Soul 
to be on a divine mission in the realm of nature. Whereas the former is detectable in 
the middle dialogues, such as Phaedo, the latter can be found in the later ones, 
Timaeus, Phaedro or Symposium. Plotinus’ positive account of sensual beauty and the 
emotional response it generates naturally takes its vitality from the latter, optimistic 
tendency. In this neoplatonic tradition, there is a direct proportion of the degree of 
being to the degree of beauty. “What does ‛really exist’ mean? That they exist as 
beauties!”79 Beauty in the sensual world is in fact the beauty of form:  
 
From what source, then, did the beauty of Helen, whom men fought for, shine out, or that 
of all the women like Aphrodite herself? ... Beauty is not to be attributed to the size of the 
mass ... but it comes through the eyes as form alone.
80
  
 
Or rather, beauty is not of form but of its source, i.e. of the Intellect, and ultimately of 
the Good. The hierarchy of beauty thus is only another side of the Neoplatonic 
ontology: “…first we must posit Beauty which is also Good, and from this 
immediately comes Intellect, which is beauty, and Soul is given beauty by Intellect... 
Soul makes beautiful the bodies which are spoken of as beautiful.”81 Thus we, as 
embodied Souls, have a unique opportunity to take beauty as a clue, which can return 
                                                                                                                                           
ἀπόρρητον οἷον ἐκφανὲν ἰδοῦσα χαίρει καὶ ἄγαται τὸ φανὲν καὶ ἐπτόηται περὶ αὐτό. Καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς 
ἁγιωτάταις τελεταῖς πρὸ τῶν μυστικῶν θεαμάτων ἔκπληξις τῶν μυουμένων, οὕτω δὴ κἀν τοῖς νοητοῖς 
πρὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίας τὸ κάλλος προφαινόμενον ἐκπλήττει τοὺς ὁρῶντας. Transl. by R. Gnoli 
in: Gnoli 1956, XLVII. 
76 Enn. V.8.11.1-11. 
77 vismayo yogabhūmikāḥ ŚS. I.12., Singh 1980,  51-52. 
78 Singh 1980, 52. 
79 Enn. I.6.5.21 Again, some lines later: ...so for God, the qualities of Goodness and Beauty are the 
same… 
80 Enn. V.8.2.9-27. 
81 Enn. I.6.6.25-27. 
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us to the spiritual world of Intellect or even beyond it.
82
 This transition is in fact 
“easy” since the Good is the ultimate source of all human desire.83  
  The origin of the emotion of love is, according to Plotinus, a “longing for beauty 
itself, which was there before in men’s Souls”. 84  The very definition of love, 
therefore, is an activity of the Soul reaching after the good.
85
 In his system, beauty is 
the concrete way by which the transcendence in immanence is realized, since “If he 
(the god) is absent from the universe, he will be absent from you”.86 Beauty, then, 
serves as a bridge by which the gap between the body, the Soul and the Intellect can 
be traversed.  
  Referring to Plato’s Symposium,87 Plotinus differentiates between two Aphrodites, 
the Heavenly Mother of Eros (Ourania) and the common mother of Eros (Pandemos), 
with two corresponding kinds of love. The difference dwells in the lover’s 
recognition of the ultimate source of beauty in the beloved object. But Plotinus does 
not brush aside the Eros of the common Aphrodite, wherein the lover fails to 
recognize the ultimate source of beauty and love in its true nature. He does note that a 
purer nature of bodily love is enjoyed in a “platonic” way, rather than in the way of 
fully developed sexual intercourse.
88
 But wise men, recollecting the source of beauty, 
focusing there, and thus practising a higher form of heavenly Aphrodite’s erotics, do 
not condemn the lower form, since they know the playful creativity of the higher form: 
“but others, those who have recollected the archetype, venerate that higher beauty 
and also do not treat this earthly beauty with disrespect since they see in it the 
creation and play-thing of that other”.89 It is to be remembered that the bewitching 
power of beauty, which can make the Soul ascend to its ultimate source, is 
apprehended in a delight and intense concentration on the vision
90
 reached by the 
enchanting power of love. 
 The aforementioned topic of divine play is also interesting since the doctrine of 
the Playfulness of the Absolute is central to some Indian traditions; this includes the 
famous Vaiṣnava cult of young Kṛṣṇa but it also appears in Advaitavedānta,91 and 
especially in the Paramādvaita. In the passage cited above, Plotinus expresses 
something quite similar in describing vertical relations inside the systemic hierarchy: 
the creative energy of the higher levels can be described as play in relation to the 
lower. This idea remained unexplored and undeveloped in Neoplatonism, though an 
                                                 
82 In the system of Plotinus “we” can even penetrate, with the help of love, the level of Intellect and 
reach its apex, the Good itself: Καὶ ἕως τί ἐστιν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ παρόντος, αἴρεται φύσει ἄνω αἰρομένη 
ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος τὸν ἔρωτα. Plot. Enn. VI.7.22.19-21. 
83 Enn. I.6.7.2. 
84 Enn. III.5.1.17. 
85 Enn. III.5.4.24. 
86 Enn. II.9.16.25. 
87Symp. 180d. 
88 Enn. III.5.1. 17-18. 
89 Enn. III.5.1.63-5. 
90 Enn. III.5.3.9-10. 
91 In the Advaita tradition the divine play as a reason of creation, as an answer on the question “why 
(of creation)” is  present already in Brahmasūtra (Br.S. II.1.33) 
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option it remained. We can imagine this concept resolving many difficulties with the 
freedom of the first principle.
92
 
  In the context of Paramādvaita, the doctrine of the divine play  (līlā, krīḍā) means 
that the dynamic absolute creates, sustains, and withdraws the world freely and from 
its own will, playfully hiding and enfolding itself in it.
93
 This play is real,
94
 and as 
such it manifests the unlimited freedom of its source.
95
  Since the border line of 
micro/macro cosm is a bit fuzzy in this radical Kashmiri holism, it is no wonder that 
we also find the doctrine of play on the level of everyday orthopraxis. Here, divine 
play is a mode of being of an enlightened yogi, who playfully abides in the world of 
saṃsāra, performing all his activities in a playful way and by such means remains 
untouched by the misery of saṃsāra – even in the middle of its wild stream.96   
Spontaneity is another side of such playfulness, as discussed above. 
 Yet there is another connected topos belonging to the semantic field of ‘play’, 
which we find on the both sides of our comparandum. It is the world as theatre with 
the Soul as an actor.  This simile occurs both in Neoplatonism, e.g. “...but in a truer 
poetic creation, which men who have a poetic nature imitate in part, the Soul acts, 
receiving the part which it acts from the poet creator”,97 and quite frequently in the 
Paramādvaita, wherein e.g. “the Self is an actor, the stage is the inner Soul, the 
senses are spectators”, to cite the most respected locus communis on this topic.98 
 
Abhinavagupta and others further elaborate this simile using Indian aesthetics, 
namely the school of rasavāda, which considers “emotional juice” (rasa) to be the 
ultimate goal of artistic performance.
99
  All other dramatic or poetical means such as 
plot, figure, dance, music etc., merely serve the transmission of rasa. This requires 
genuine active intuition (pratibhā) on the side of artist-creator and the same portion 
of passive intuition on the side of spectator.
100
 
                                                 
92 E.g., Enn VI.8., which is one of the famous treaties on freedom of the first principle. Its conclusioun 
is: (The One) actually is what it wants to be...”(Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα ἐβούλετο, οὕτω καὶ ἔστιν) Enn. 
VI.8.13.9. 
93  Creation (sṛṣṭi), maintenance (sthiti), withdrawal (saṃhṛti), covering (tirodhana) and grace 
(anugraha) are main activities of Paramādvaitic absolute. 
94 Unlike in Advaita vedānta, where this play would be  interpreted as illusion māya. See Baumer 
1995, 37-38. 
95 TA 101, heyopādeyakathāvirahe svānandaghanatayocchalanam | krīḍā sarvotkarṣeṇa vartanecchā 
tathā svatantratvam  
96 SKV 29:... iti vā yasya saṃvittiḥ krīḍātvenākhilaṃ jagat | sa paśyansatataṃ yukto jīvanmukto na 
saṃśayaḥ... See SK. II.5. Singh 1980, 119.  See also Dyczkowski 1992, line 165. 
97 Enn. III.2.17.28. Transl. by Armstrong, See also Proclus, De decem dub. 60 (TLG ed.). 
98 ŚS. III.9-11:nartaka ātmā / raṅgo'ntarātmā / prekṣakāṇīndriyāṇi Dyczkowski, MBDL 2005, line 
73-75. 
99 Based on Bharatamuni’s Nāṭyaśāstra. See 6.15. “The following eight rasas should be remembered 
in drama: loving, ridiculous, sad, angry, heroic, terrible, disgusting and 
wonderful.”śṛṅgārahāsyakaruṇā raudravīrabhayānakāḥ / bībhatsādbhutasaṃjñau cetyaṣṭau nāṭye 
rasāḥ smṛtāḥ (Abhinavagupta adds to this list a ninth, peaceful rasa, as either another member of the 
raw, or as a basis of the remaining eight rasas. See Masson 1969,91-151). 
100 Gnoli 1956, L-LI, n.1. 
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The tasting of rasa takes an active part within the spectator’s Soul. In fact, it is a 
tasting of the delight of one’s own consciousness (svasaṃvidcarvaṇā).101 This delight 
is revealed to the concentrated “unobstacled” consciousness (nirvighna cit). 102 
Abhinavagupta describes this state in similar terms both in his aesthetical and 
philosophical works: as the repose in one’s own self (svātmaviśrānti) which is caused 
either by the flow of the emotional juice (rasa) or by yogic meditation.
103
 
Occasionally, he compares both states: the non-difference of consciousness 
(saṃvidabheditatva) reached by aesthetic delight (rasāsvāda) and the fullness of 
consciousness (saṃvidpūrṇatva) reached step by step in yoga (brahmāsvāda).104 As 
the ultimate sense of drama is tasting the essence, rasa, i.e. one of the 8 primary 
emotions, so too the ultimate sense of theatrum mundi is tasting the essence or “juice” 
of it, i.e., consciousness.
105
   
 The Supreme Lord’s unique state of emotivity is the outpouring of pure Being. It is 
manifest as the brilliance (sphurattā) of the universe which, if we ponder deeply, is the single 
flavour (ekarasa) of the essence of Beauty which is the vibration of the bliss of one’s own 
nature.
106 
 The last related metaphor to which I would draw attention is that of the dance of 
the Soul. On both sides of our comparison, it serves an expression of the dynamic 
nature of consciousness. Thus according to Plotinus, Time (chronos) belongs to the 
sphere of Soul, and is considered to be the moving image of eternity. The meaning is 
explained and ethymologized by Proclus as a circular dance (choros) around the 
Intellect (choros-nous).
107
 We find the same metaphor expressing the same thought in 
Paramādvaita, where Time (kāla)108 and its constantly changing nature is described 
                                                 
101 See Masson 1969. 42-43.  
102 “Once one has overcome distraction, the pleasure one enjoys through the sentiments of love etc., 
expressed in poetry or drama for example, differs from the pleasure derived from sense object. This is 
because (one gains access to it) by removal of such obstacles as anticipation of possible personal gain. 
So, once freed of these impediments, the experience (pratīti) is one of relishing (rasanā), tasting 
(carvaṇa) or contentment (nirvṛti) and is, in fact, repose in cognising subjectivity.”  (Abhinavagupta, 
īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī,  Transl. in Dyczkowski 1989, 148.) 
103 Masson 1969. 42-43, 153-164. 
104  ...kṣaṇake tattaddraṣṭṭasaṃvidabheditām || kramoditāṃ sadya eva labhate tatpraveśanāt 
yogābhyāsakramopāttāṃ tathā pūrṇāṃ svasaṃvidam || Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 16065-68. 
But in fact “ ..the bliss that comes from finding rest in God is far superior (prakṛṣyate), ...aesthetic 
pleasure (rasāsvāda) is only reflection (avabhāsa) of drop (vipruṣ) of that mystic bliss.” 
(Abhinavagupta, Dhvynyālokālocana, transl in Masson, 1969, 158) 
105 ...The so called supreme bliss, the lysis, the wonder, is therefore nothing but a tasting, that is, a 
cogitation in all its compact density, of our own liberty... Gnoli 1956, XLIV. See also  Dyczkowski 
1989, 147-8. 
106 Mahārthamañjarī, transl. In Dyczkowski 1989, 51. 
107 In Tim. III.9.16-18; 28.00. Plotinus used the metaphor of circular dance for the movement of stars 
(considered as ensouled bodies). However, this movement is an expression of perfect harmony and 
eternal life of All-Soul. (Enn. IV.4.8.).  In general, the One is depicted as a point, the Intellect as a 
circle, and the Soul as a moving circle. (Enn. IV.4.15.) 
108 According to the nomenclature of the system, kāla is one of 6 “coverings” which cover the 
fettered consciousness of an embodied Soul. (IPK+IPKV, III.2.4-19.) But here we focus on the 
dynamic nature of consciousness in general. 
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as the wheel of energies, (śakticakra) 109 and understood as a sequence of 12 kālīs.110 
This everlasting movement of power, which expresses itself in the changing forms of 
the wheel of energies that turns with each single act of cognition, is often 
metaphorically depicted as dancing (nṛtyantī) goddess, Śakti, the power of the 
absolute, as she moves round  Śiva,  the eternal witness, the absolute itself.111 
 The key term, which bridges the aesthetics and philosophy of Paramādvaita, is 
camatkāra (verbatim: savouring, meaning: astonishment, wonder). It is a mood into 
which God is driven by his own Śakti.112 Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta use it as a 
near synonym for reflective awareness  (vimarśa).113 There is a good reason for this: 
the reflective awareness  is a savouring of the pure, expanding consciousness. This is 
accompanied by wonder and astonishment.
114
 It is cit-śakti in her highest form and as 
such she is often hailed.
115
 
 The enchanting power of beauty naturally concentrates the mind and brings the 
attentive yogi towards its vibrant source, which actually lays within himself. This is 
why we are often advised in Tantras
116
 to follow an aesthetic experience of whatever 
kind (food, art, music, and poetry, as well as love affairs and other erotic situations). 
E.g., in Vijñānabhairavatantra where, after several suggestions to concentrate on 
different sources of sensual beauty, we find the teaching summarized: “Wherever the 
mind finds joy manifested, that should be contemplated (by a yogi) since that is the 
true nature of ultimate joy (which is Śiva, the dynamic absolute itself).”117  
                                                 
109 SK I.1, SKV 3. 
110 E.g. by Kṣemarāja in SpN: Singh 1980 7,13. 
111 E.g.: SKV 164.: He (Śambhu, Śiva), like a newly wedded husband, constantly gazes at His beloved 
power Who, although inwardly undivided, dances in many ways outside (Her) own nature, (Her) 
diverse forms and seemingly new aspects conceived in the varied light of thought. (Transl. By 
Dyczkowski 1981, 126) 
112 Abhinavagupta in  Abhinavabhāratī gives a classical example of camatkāra: ...“Viṣṇu is still 
today in a state of  camatkāra: how, oh how is that limbs of Lakṣmī, which are like the borders of a 
limb of the moon, have not been convulsed by mount Mandara?” That is to say, what is called 
camatkāra is an uninterrupted state of immersion (āveśa) in an Enjoyment... (Translated in Seturaman, 
1992, 47). 
113 IPKV 1.5.11, For a detailed summary of the semantic field of camatkāra, see also n. 23 in Torella 
2002, 118-119. 
114 “...The words wonder (camatkāra), immersion (nirveśa), tasting (rasanā), sampling (āsvādana), 
enjoyment (bhoga), accomplishment (samāpatti), lysis (laya), rest (viśrānti) etc., mean simply a form 
of consciousness completely free from any obstacles.” Abhinavabhāratī, translated in Seturaman, 
1992, 49. 
115  Abhinavagupta e.g. in PTV comments on Utpaladeva, IPK I.6.7 cited above (n. 31): 
svātmacamatkārarūpā  śāktollāsamayaviśvāmarśanarūpa (..it is the  wonder of once own self, the 
playful  power of all forms of reflective awareness..) Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 572-573. In the 
same text he hails the consort of Śiva   ...svātantryaikarasāveśacamatkāraikalakṣaṇā  parā bhagavatī 
… (the supreme goddess characterized by only sign of wonder which originates only from immersion 
into the essence of freedom) Dyczkowski, MBDL (2005), line 4610. 
116 Non-dualistic tantras are an older, revealed, anonymous layer of the younger “scholastic” one, as 
represented by Abhinavagupta and other commentators. 
117  V.Bh. 74: yatra yatra manastuṣṭirmanastatraiva dhārayet | tatra tatra parānandasvarūpaṃ 
saṃpravartate || 
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 Keeping all this in mind, we can conclude that for both Neoplatonism and 
Paramādvaita aesthetic beauty and the emotional response it generates (ekplexis, 
camatkāra) are means which help the Soul, first to concentrate its mind-stream and 
forget worldly affairs, then to follow the impulse within and reflect directly upon 
herself. This movement might even lead to union (henosis, samāveṣa) with the source 
of all beauty, consciousness itself.  In both systems this source lays beyond the form 
through which it is communicated. Both systems advise the use of the enchanting 
power of beauty in a contemplative mental experiment as a means by which to shift 
consciousness from a discursive modus of mind towards non-discursive intuition: in 
terms of Neoplatonism, this means the ascent from sense perception (aisthesis) and 
discursive thinking (dianoia) towards intuitive seeing (noesis); in Paramādvaita the 
same movement is from direct experience (pratyakṣa) and the mental construct it 
generates (vikalpa), towards intuition (pratibhā) and reflective awareness (vimarṣa).  
The similar doctrinal base is moreover occasionally expressed by the similar  
metaphors, like that of theatrum mundi, or the dance of the Soul. 
 Thus one of the most striking features of both systems is their ability to 
incorporate sensual beauty and the emotional response generated by it, within their 
metaphysical and soteriological frames. Both Neoplatonism and the Paramādvaita do 
so in an analogical socio-historical context, as both faced an orthodox ascetic 
intellectual environment which avoided any contact with the world of sense and its 
beauty, considering it a dangerous trap of illusion. There is perhaps no coincidence 
that both Plotinus and Abhinavagupta were great philosophers and aestheticians at 
once. In both cases their doctrines were addressed to educated laymen, not monks of 
some particular religious sect. The philosophers did not wished to cut the social 
branch that they were sitting on. And so the world in its physical form was not 
intellectualized away but saved by contemplative focus on its beauty.  
  
4. FURTHER PERSPECTIVES OF RESEARCH ON  
NEOPLATONISM  AND PARAMĀDVAITA 
 
If a high degree of correspondence of Neoplatonism and Paramādvaita has been 
successfully demonstrated, a wide field opens up that has not yet been a subject of 
study, as far as I know, neither in this nor in any other text. First, how far might this 
correspondence progress and what are its limits? I am, of course, conscious of the 
basic nature of the Platonic tradition, which is “objectivist”, as well as the nature of 
Paramādvaita, which is “subjectivist”. But some passages in Enneads can be 
interpreted as steps towards non-dual, subject-based thinking as we know it from 
India, where some Advaita traditions correspond more or less accurately with their 
doctrines. We might conclude that some of the ideas of Enneads can be found in the 
scriptural corpus of Paramādvaita, where we can find them perhaps in a developed 
and radicalised form. We can also find corresponding elements within the notion of 
the dynamic absolute, the radical subjectivism wherein the “outer world” depends on 
the Soul whose freedom is both its natural state and the ultimate goal of human life, 
the doctrine of multilevelled subjectivity connected with the doctrine of multileveled 
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speech, the doctrine of mutual interdependence or even interpenetration of everything 
with everything else. This list merely summarizes some of the most important topics, 
most of which have been discussed above; and all this needs further discussion by 
specialists in each subject. But if our thesis stands up such discussion, what further 
questions might be asked?  
 How is it possible that this philosophical doctrine seems to have travelled across 
geographical and cultural boundaries with such unbelievable ease? This might be 
explained either by the nature of the subject itself, namely the nature of the mind as it 
appears under a focused and systematic introspection, which is the method par 
excellence of both compared systems, or by a cross-cultural exchange of ideas based 
on real contact on oral or textual level. Let us return once more to F. Staal and apply 
one of his conclusions here: since direct textual parallels, e.g. translations, seem 
difficult to be found, the question of real contact may remain forever open as its 
answer more or less depends on the personal preferences of each interpreter.
118
 We 
could take the first path and presume that doctrinal parallels are derived from the 
nature of the mind itself; we are thus led to the old doctrine of eternal philosophy 
(philosophia perennis or theologia prisca), originated in Corpus hermeticum and 
formulated e.g. by the Renaissance Platonist Marsilio Ficino: an ethernal universal 
wisdom which has been imparted to all nations by their prophets.
119
 Taking the path 
of “influence” would on the other hand lead to an increasingly detailed study of 
history with a proportionally increasing degree of speculative theorising based on the 
growing amount of material of such study. 
 I began my text by promising for methodological reasons to abstain from 
hypothesizing about the influence between these systems; however, we cannot 
altogether exclude the possibility that this occurred. Historical and archaeological 
research in the Kashmiri region might reopen the question from an alternative 
perspective. Can we expect the rise of a “Hellenistic hypothesis” from the ruins of the 
“Orientalist”? Keeping in mind the unique Greco-Indian cultural mixture of northern 
Bactria, we have a double reason for not excluding such option. 
 I would be especially interested in exploring a further question. If we insist on 
abstaining from questions of influence, can we explain the similarity by use of 
structural reason?  Both systems are a late stadium of a long existing tradition of 
monistic idealism, each of its kind. Could their similarity be caused by their similar 
polemical interaction with a similar opponent? What about the influence of criticism 
from a sceptical position on such an idealism? From what we know of the history of 
both systems, they were under fire by sceptics and their anti-substantionalistic or 
generally anti-metaphysical and anti-dogmatic dialectic. (“Nothing is in itself more 
this than that”).120 With one, it was the polemic with Mahāyāna Buddhism.121 With 
                                                 
118 Staal 1961, 23. 
119 We could find the same concept under the name ‘sanātana dharma’  in India. 
120 In its highly formalized form the skepsis condensed in both tradition to the “fourfold formula”: 
Nāgārjuna: One should say of each thing that it neither is, nor is not, nor both is and is not, nor 
neither is nor is not.  
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the other, it was the polemic with late-antic scepticism.
122
 Recent scholarship 
suggests that the middle way school (Mādhyamika) of Nāgārjuna, with its sudden 
blossoming of Buddhist skepsis based on developed  dialectic. 
 
 ...(Which) originated in the Greco-Buddhist communities of India through a conflation 
of the Greek Democritean-sophistic-sceptical tradition with rudimentary and 
unformalized empirical and sceptical elements already present in early Buddhism.
123 
 
 We might hypothesize that the reaction of monistic idealism to devastating 
sceptical arguments that target its notion of substance and therefore all its doctrines, 
be it permanent, immortal Soul, or omnipotent, creative absolute,
124
 might be to 
develop an emphasis on the dynamic nature of the first principle, based on radical 
holism and personal contemplative experience.  Greek philosophers used the weapon 
of dialectic with two contradictory motives. The metaphysical branch, represented by 
the Plato, Parmenides and partly by the Academy, used dialectic to destroy belief in 
the reality of conditioned being so that a mystical intuition of unconditioned being 
might be ensured, whereas the critical branch, represented by Democritus, Pyrhon 
and Sextus, used dialectic to free the mind from the belief that mind-concepts 
correspond to reality, so as to develop a suspension of belief (epoche), followed by an 
emotional balance of the mind  (ataraxia).
125
  
 In India, the critical branch would roughly correspond to early Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, whereas the metaphysical branch would correspond to Advaita stream of 
Indian philosophical thinking, including to some extent, with its uncompromised 
emphasis on transcendence-in-immanence and blending of realism and idealism. 
Paramādvaita can be rather seen as a synthesis of both views, although with obvious 
prevalence of metaphysical over the critical.  
 The “structural hypothesis” is further supported by the fact that the Mahāyāna 
school has undergone the same development, i.e. a shift to a metaphysical position of 
essentialism. Thus Mahāyāna in its later stages, in order to emphasize the activity of 
Buddha-nature that expresses itself in acts of wisdom and compassion, tried to 
overcome early Mādhyamika scepticism by the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine.  
According to this doctrine of the germ of Buddhahood (Tathāgatagarbha), the 
highest Buddha-nature (dharmakāya) as the eternal  innermost core of reality is 
                                                                                                                                           
Sextus Empiricus: We should say of each thing that it no more is than is not, than both is and is 
not, than neither is nor is not.  
121 See Kawajiri 2006, Ratie 2010. 
122 Mostly Sextus Empiricus, See Kuhn 2008. The similarities of Buddhist and Greek scepticism is 
discussed (e.g.) in Evilley 2002, 450-490. 
123 Evilley 2002, 503. “It is very suggestive that the areas of India where Mahāyāna Buddhism is most 
commonly supposed to have arisen  - Gāndhāra, Kaśmīr and Amarāvatī – are the areas where the 
Greek culture penetrated most deeply.”  Evilley 2002, 502. 
124 The (sceptical) doctrine of indeterminacy (Grk. aorista, “lack of boundary or definition” Skt. 
svabhāva śūnyatā) is simultaneously a critique of ontological claims of absolute Being or non-Being, 
of epistemological claims for knowledge...and of the view there is a language-reality isomorphism. 
125 Evilley 2002, 420. 
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immune to the sceptic dialectic of Mādhyamika, for which everything is relative, 
mind-only (vijnāptimātra), and  thereby without its true nature (asvabhāva), lacking 
the self (anātma)  and impermanent (anitya).126 
      Consideration of the structural question is beyond the reach of this text, but let me 
hope that it might serve as a ladder for those who next approach such an unexplored 
landscape: “When intellectual curiosity climbs higher and higher and sees the truth 
without getting tired, this is because of the ladders of thought built by earlier 
writers.”127 
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